Four systems can move the bank's money: the wires, the switches, the settlement engines, and the keys that sign it all. Churchill protects all four.
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The HSM signs whatever the application asks. Churchill guarantees the asker.
Churchill protects any zero-tolerance Linux workload. We started where tolerance is lowest: the path money travels. The core ledger, CICS, and z/OS stay the mainframe's job; each layer does what it does at its layer.
Nine situations you have already lived through.
Every one of these is inside the published threat boundary. Hover or tap the ones that matter to you. Each opens to show the change that actor needs to make, and what happens instead. To do damage, every one of them has to change the protected application. That is the only thing Churchill checks, which is why the actor never has to be identified first.
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None of these depend on recognizing the attacker or the technique. They depend on the change being unapproved, which is the one thing every case above has in common.
The zone got bigger this year, and your evidence for the new part is the thinnest you have.
Under CSCF v2026, Control 2.4 moved from advisory to mandatory. That pulls back-office data flows, bridging servers, middleware, and customer connectors formally into scope for the first time, and it requires independent assessment. The stated reason is the pivot pattern you already know: the attackers who took $81 million out of Bangladesh Bank did not stop at the messaging terminal. They moved into the surrounding environment, changed what the payment application ran, and suppressed the confirmations that would have shown it.
Control 2.4 is a data-flow control. What it changed for you is scope: those bridging servers, connectors and middleware are now in-scope Linux hosts. Churchill protects the integrity of those hosts and produces a dated record of what ran and every attempt to change it, which evidences the change-control and integrity families rather than 2.4 itself. Do not let anyone write 2.4 next to it in a remediation plan. That is the record Churchill writes as it happens, rather than one your team reconstructs from ticket exports in the autumn.
Churchill supports specific technical provisions within CSCF. It does not itself confer attestation, and it does not cover the controls your program owns. Provision mappings are WestGate Data Science analysis.
Start where your annual attestation is hardest. Extend along the path money travels.
You think in zones, and so does Churchill. The first deployment is the smallest critical zone you have; each expansion follows the authority, on a deployment pattern your operations team has already seen hold.
Churchill supports control families in SWIFT CSP, DORA, NYDFS Part 500, and PCI DSS 4.0; it does not itself confer any attestation or compliance. Platform fit for a specific workload is confirmed during technical qualification.
Every feed you buy describes someone else's breach. This one describes yours.
The gate sees every attempt on a protected payment host, so the record it writes is intelligence about your own rails, from your own attackers, on the day it happens. It arrives without a production incident attached to it.
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Setup follows your governance. Then Churchill refuses, autonomously.
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Between releases there is nothing to manage: no ticket queue, no daily review burden, no added FTEs. At release time, a minimum of two members of the quorum you designed sign the change, in seconds, at 2 a.m. or 5 p.m., and a single veto denies. Nothing else about your release process changes.
Linux on x86_64 and IBM Z / LinuxONE · containers, virtual machines, bare metalProve it on the zone your board already fears by name.
30 days free in non-production. Installs in minutes, removes cleanly. Production follows a joint engineering session, our team and yours.
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Churchill is built and validated on IBM LinuxONE.